A Complex Jurisdictional Question in a Pro Se Appeal

By Chris Mincher

It is tempting to assume that unreported pro se appeals do not deserve much attention. Oftentimes, the results are not the resolution of substantive legal questions but the recognition that the pro se parties do not know what they are doing. Yet this supposition is not universally true; usually because a pro se party doesn’t spot them, there can be sneaky interesting issues hidden just below the opinion’s surface.  

One such recent Appellate Court case in the administrative-law context is In the Matter of Ngozika Nwaneri, No. 1451 (October 19, 2026). Shenandoah Life Insurance Company canceled two of petitioner’s policies and he challenged that to the Maryland Insurance Commissioner, who rendered a summary decision in favor of Shenandoah. The petitioner then sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.

The Circuit Court dismissed the petition as failing to satisfy the memorandum requirements of Md. Rule 7-207(a) — that’s in the section governing petitions for judicial review of agency decisions — because its content was unsupported, lacking legal authority, and failed to properly cite the record. The petitioner then appealed to the Appellate Court.

Limiting the Scope of Appellate Review

For the Appellate Court to hear an appeal of a petition for judicial review, there must be an independent grant of jurisdiction. Here, that came from § 2-215(j)(1) of the Insurance Article of the Maryland Code (we’ll abbreviate that as “IN”), which provides, “Any party, including the Commissioner, may appeal from the judgment of the circuit court to the Appellate Court of Maryland as in other civil cases.”

On its face, that would seem enough to permit the petitioner’s appeal of the circuit court’s judgment on his petition. But the Appellate Court looked back a step to determine whether the statute authorized the circuit court’s judgment that it was being asked to review. IN § 2-215(h) reads: “The court to which an appeal is taken may: (1) affirm the decision of the Commissioner; (2) remand for further proceedings; or (3) reverse or modify the decision of the Commissioner[.]”

As the Appellate Court noted, the circuit court in this case didn’t do any of those things — it dismissed the petition on procedural grounds. The Maryland Rules for these petitions indicate that a dismissal is distinct from an affirmance: Md. Rule 7-209 states, “Unless otherwise provided by law, the court may dismiss the action for judicial review or may affirm, reverse, or modify the agency’s order or action, remand the action to the agency for further proceedings, or an appropriate combination of the above.” “Dismiss” and “affirm” are two different things.

As the Appellate Court saw it, its appellate jurisdiction was “tethered to the reviewing circuit court entering a judgment pursuant to IN § 2-215(h), i.e., one that actually reviews the Insurance Commissioner’s decision.” All the petitioner’s questions presented were about the circuit court “affirming” the Insurance Commissioner’s decision, but that is not what the circuit court did, so the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal.

Whether Dismissal is a “Judgment of the Circuit Court”

Okay… but wait just a minute before clicking through to the next unreported opinion; I want to unpack a couple things here. The conclusion seems indisputably correct: Because the circuit court dismissed the action, but the questions presented didn’t challenge the grounds for the dismissal, the appeal didn’t raise valid issues for the Appellate Court to resolve. Simple enough.

But there’s some other stuff here that’s a little more interesting. The Appellate Court also said that it couldn’t hear any appeal unless it was from one of the dispositions listed in IN § 2-215(h). Now, the provision for Appellate Court jurisdiction in IN § 2-215(j)(1) doesn’t say that — it just says a party can appeal from a judgment of the circuit court, without limiting it to the dispositions of IN § 2-215(h) or anything else.

Looking at just the language of the statute, any circuit court judgment resulting from a petition for judicial review, including a dismissal, would seem to be appealable. “Judgment” isn’t otherwise defined in the statute or in the applicable chapter of the Maryland Rules. But even if, as the Appellate Court concluded, its jurisdiction is tied to what the circuit court is allowed to do, that isn’t totally clear either.

Dismissal is Not a Statutory Disposition

IN § 2-215(h) says that the circuit court “may” affirm, remand, reverse, or modify; it doesn’t say the circuit court “shall” do one of those things or may only do those things. As a general matter, the word “may” in a statute usually indicates permission or authorization, though that “can sometimes have a limiting effect.” See Bethesda African Cemetery Coalition v. Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County, 489 Md. 1, 62 (2024).

Here, if “may” is permissive and describes some, but not all, potential dispositions, it wouldn’t prevent the circuit court from additionally dismissing a petition as is allowed in Md. Rule 7-209. In that instance, why wouldn’t that dismissal be a “judgment of the circuit court” that could be appealed to the Appellate Court “as in other civil cases”?

On the other hand, it wouldn’t make a whole lot of sense for “may” to be permissive here. If it is, IN § 2-215(h) doesn’t really do anything, because the circuit court can already affirm, remand, reverse, or modify pursuant to Md. Rule 7-209. But if the statute is read as limiting what the circuit court could otherwise do pursuant to Md. Rule 7-209, then the circuit court can’t dismiss a petition for judicial review at all, because that’s not one of the specified dispositions.

That would mean the circuit court can’t dismiss a petition for violation of Md. Rule 7-207 or any other of the applicable rules for judicial review, because the agency has, by statute, taken dismissal off the table. That would also be a weird outcome, because why wouldn’t an agency want the circuit court to be able to dismiss deficient petitions that don’t abide by the Rules? But, heck, the statute says what it says.

(Although it might seem unworkable for the circuit court not to be able to dismiss, I don’t see why that would have to be the outcome — the circuit court can just exclude procedurally improper materials and decide on the merits. For example, here, the circuit court could have excluded the petitioner’s memorandum as deficient and then affirmed the agency’s decision based on the balance of evidence properly before it.)

Provocative Questions Left Unpresented

Herein lieth the conundrum. (Mental note to self: use “lieth” in everyday speech more often.) Either the statute doesn’t preclude a circuit court from dismissing a petition pursuant to Md. Rule 7-209, which would be a permissible “judgment of the circuit court” for which there is Appellate Court review, or the statute doesn’t give the circuit court the option to dismiss and the circuit court in Nwaneri erred in doing so.

If it is the latter, how would a petitioner secure reversal of an erroneous dismissal, given that the Appellate Court in Nwaneri has held it doesn’t have jurisdiction to hear those appeals at all? Can a circuit court dismiss a petition for whatever arbitrary or mistaken reason it wants without risk of Appellate Court review? That may be another reason why it would make sense to read “judgment of the circuit court” in IN § 2-215(j)(1) inclusively and holistically.

Now, however curious or noteworthy these issues may be, they weren’t raised by the petitioner in the Nwaneri appeal. As the Appellate Court noted, “this Court cannot present on its own volition appealable questions for any party.” The ultimate takeaway from Nwaneri may simply be the continued recognition that — even when the Appellate Court, like here, is “sympathetic to Dr. Nwaneri’s pro se status” — such parties typically do not know what they are doing.