Five for Five: Five Justices Conclude the five-year Limit to Modify a Sentence is Jurisdictional in a 3-1-2-1 Decision

By: Isabelle Raquin

On August 29, 2024, a three-justice plurality and a two-justice concurrence of the Supreme Court of Maryland (SCM) agreed in State v. Thomas, No. 15 (Sept. Term 2023), that the five-year deadline under Maryland Rule 4-345(e)(1) for a circuit court to hear a motion to modify a sentence was a self-imposed jurisdictional deadline per the court’s rule-making authority. Previously, the SCM had held, in the context of the 30-day time to file a notice of appeal, that a deadline established by the SCM’s rule-making authority is a mandatory claims processing rule; which, of course, the parties may waive or forfeit without divesting the court of the power to act. In reliance on the logical application of the mandatory claims processing rule to the court-imposed five-year time for a circuit court to hold a hearing under Rule 4-345(e)(1), Mr. Thomas appealed the circuit court’s failure to timely schedule a hearing as requested, and its subsequent denial of the motion to modify once the deadline passed.

Five justices (Fader, CJ, Hotten, Booth, Gould, Eaves) agreed that the deadline set by the rule is jurisdictional. Therefore, the circuit court “may not revise a sentence after the expiration of five years from the date the sentence was originally imposed on the defendant.” Justice Eaves and Justice Hooten also concluded that the circuit court’s failure to decide the motion within five years was a quintessential abuse of discretion, but one without a remedy because the court had no power to act after five years. Justice Biran concurred in the judgment but concluded that the time was a mandatory claims processing rule. Justice Watts dissented, concluding that the time was mandatory, but was neither jurisdictional nor a claims processing rule, and that the circuit court abused its discretion.

The Thomas decision has sweeping implications for the practice in circuit courts because the mandatory claims processing rule provided a safety valve for the parties and the court when they had good cause to agree upon a hearing date after the five years. Also, the Thomas decision undermines the SCM’s decision of recent vintage that the five-year clock resets when relief is obtained through a postconviction proceeding. Justice Biran expressed skepticism about the jurisprudential underpinnings of such an approach given the implications of the SCM’s holding that the five-year deadline is a court-imposed jurisdictional limitation. There is also a practical concern that the unforgiving time under Rule 4-345(e)(1) will encourage circuit courts to downgrade motions to modify to the category of “noted and no action taken” to wait out the clock without deciding the motion. That would be unfortunate, because Maryland has a long history of effectively utilizing motions to modify to encourage defendants along the path of rehabilitation.

The Facts of the Case. In 2002, Mr. Thomas was indicted in the Circuit Court for Charles County. On May 15, 2003, the court sentenced him to 40 years of incarceration. His sentence was modified on December 3, 2014. The new five-year period expired on December 3, 2019. Between 2015 and 2019, counsel for Mr. Thomas filed five motions on his previous motions held in abeyance, requesting a hearing. The court entered an order for each of them such as “noted” or “held in abeyance” but did not set a hearing. In his later motions, counsel for Mr. Thomas alerted the court to the approaching five-year deadline. No action was taken by the court. On January 8, 2021, after the five-year deadline had passed, Mr. Thomas, pro se, supplemented his motion and requested a hearing. A hearing was held on June 16, 2021. The court, however, concluded that it had no authority to reduce his sentence after the expiration of the five-year period under Rule 4-345(e)(1) and denied the motion to reconsider.

The ACM Holding. The ACM reversed the circuit court’s decision that it had no authority to reduce Mr. Thomas’ sentence after the expiration of the five-year period under Rule 4-345(e)(1). The ACM relied on Schlick v State, which held that the circuit court retained fundamental jurisdiction over a timely-filed Rule 4-345(e) motion even after the five-year period expired.

The SCM Holding. The SCM overruled Schlick v. State. It held that the language of Rule 4-345(e)(1) is unambiguous, it grants the circuit court revisory power over a sentence and imposes a strict temporal limit on its ability to exercise such power. The subsection provides that the court “may not” revise a sentence after the five-year period and the Court specified that the General Assembly defines “may not” as having “a mandatory negative effect and establish[ing] a prohibition.” Md. Code Ann., Gen. Prov. (“GP”) § 1-203 (2014, 2019 Repl. Vol.). Thus, the circuit court did not err when it denied the motion to modify because it did precisely what the rule expressly required.

A Simple Holding? Not So Much. The Majority opinion led to one concurring opinion by Justice Biran (Maryland Rule 4-345(e)(1) is a mandatory claims processing rule), one concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice Eaves joined by Justice Hotten (Maryland Rule 4-345(e) is jurisdictional but the court abused its discretion by failing to rule on the motion within the five-year period), and one dissenting opinion by Justice Watts (the five-year deadline is mandatory, but neither jurisdictional nor claims-processing), all of which would require a separate blog. But the majority opinion also raises practical concerns. First, attorneys do not control the court dockets. In some jurisdictions, having a hearing scheduled within five years would require the attorney to request one at year 4, perhaps even sooner. Second, there are important reasons that would require going past the five-year deadline, which Justice Biran’s concurring highlights, such as waiver or forfeiture by the State, or “if an extension is necessary because a movant has been deprived of a legal right, or when an extension is authorized through valid use of emergency authority.” Third, because the SCM held that deferring a motion to reduce a sentence for the full five-year period is the functional equivalent to denying that motion, attorneys will likely file multiple motions if a ruling has not occurred, or file writ of mandamus, which Justice Eaves pointed out in her opinion.

Two options for More Flexibility: One, for the Legislature to remove the five-year limit or expand it. The other is for the SCM itself to modify its rule and adopt Justice Eaves’ suggestion that a defendant need only request a hearing within five years for the court to have jurisdiction. Or the SCM could carve out a good cause finding, consistent with other rules such as Maryland Rule 4-252(a), for the court to consider and allow a hearing to occur after the five-year deadline. Needless to say, this is probably not the last blog on this topic.