Fourth Circuit adds to its line of cases on untimely criminal appeals.
Last week, I posted about United States v. Oliver, in which the Fourth Circuit held that the Court has the inherent authority to dismiss an untimely criminal appeal sua sponte. As that post was about to go live, the Fourth Circuit added to its limited jurisprudence in this area in United States v. Hyman, holding that the Government did not forfeit its objection to an untimely criminal appeal by waiting to file a motion to dismiss until after the defendant filed his opening brief. Read More…
Fourth Circuit holds that it can dismiss an untimely criminal appeal sua sponte, but should do so only in very limited circumstances.
In United States v. Oliver, the Fourth Circuit recently held that the Court has the inherent authority to dismiss an untimely criminal appeal sua sponte. As a general rule, the Court said, it will not use that authority; instead, it will rely on the government to raise an objection based on untimeliness. In rare cases, however, an untimely appeal can implicate judicial interests to such an extent that not intervening would harm the court as an institution. Only in such circumstances will the Fourth Circuit exercise its authority to dismiss a criminal appeal where the government has forfeited or waived its objection. Read More…
SCOTUS vindicates 2008 Judge Wilner opinion on tolling of limitations
By Steve Klepper (Twitter: @MDAppeal)
On Monday, in Artis v. District of Columbia, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved a division of authority on the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). Under § 1367(d), when a federal court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim, the limitations period on that claim “shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the five-justice majority, noted a division of authority on the application of the statute:
The high courts of Maryland and Minnesota, along with the Sixth Circuit, have held that §1367(d)’s tolling rule pauses the clock on the statute of limitations until 30 days after the state-law claim is dismissed. See In re Vertrue Inc. Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation, 719 F. 3d 474, 481 (CA6 2013); Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc., 777 N. W. 2d 755, 759–760 (Minn. 2010); Turner v. Kight, 406 Md. 167, 180–182, 957 A. 2d 984, 992–993 (2008). In addition to the D. C. Court of Appeals, the high courts of California and the Northern Mariana Islands have held that §1367(d) provides only a 30-day grace period for the refiling of otherwise time-barred claims. See Los Angeles v. County of Kern, 59 Cal. 4th 618, 622, 328 P. 3d 56, 58 (2014); Juan v. Commonwealth, 2001 MP 18, 6 N. Mar. I. 322, 327 (2001).
Maryland found itself on the winning side of that division of authority, Read More…
January 2018 Maryland Certiorari Grants
The Court of Appeals has granted 5 writs since our last certiorari post:
Schneider Electric in the Court of Appeals – So Much for Efficient Resolution of Surety Bond Disputes and Policies Favoring Arbitration over Litigation
Deciding in favor of litigation over arbitration, the Court of Appeals, in Schneider Elec. Bldgs. Critical Systems, Inc. v. Western Surety Co., 454 Md. 698, 165 A.3d 485 (2017) (“Schneider Electric”), affirmed a decision of the Court of Specials Appeals, discussed in this blog on June 26, 2017.
Schneider Electric Buildings Critical Systems, Inc. (“Schneider”), a contractor, had been given a performance bond by NCS, its subcontractor. Despite their Master Subcontractor Agreement requiring dispute resolution by arbitration, and the performance bond, issued by Western Surety Company (“Surety”), binding NCS and the Surety “jointly and severally . . . to [Schneider] for the performance of the Construction Contract, which is incorporated herein by reference[,]” the Court of Appeals followed the intermediate appellate court in ruling that the Surety could choose litigation and need not participate with NCS in the arbitration that Schneider brought. Read More…
Why The Baltimore City Circuit Court May Transfer More Tort Cases in 2018
By Derek Stikeleather
A recent Court of Appeals opinion has shaken one of the main pillars that plaintiffs have rested on when resisting transfers to a more convenient forum—deference to the plaintiff’s chosen venue. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp. v. Kerrigan, — A.3d —-, 2017 WL 5711857 (Md. Nov. 28, 2017). By expressly holding that trial judges owe little deference to a plaintiff’s chosen venue when no plaintiff resides there, the Kerrigan opinion significantly weakens plaintiffs’ ability to secure the most plaintiff-friendly venues in any case that involves multiple venues. Read More…
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