In the past 10 years, Maryland’s appellate courts have labored to get the message to practitioners that Md. Rule 8-414 (“[o]n motion or on its own initiative, the appellate court may order that an error or omission in the record be corrected”) is not a way for a party to get stuff into the appellate record that wasn’t presented to the lower court. This conclusion, firmly articulated in Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., LLC, 388 Md. 1, 10 n. 9 (2005), has been reiterated in a handful of opinions since — including Li v. Lee, 210 Md. App. 73, 94-96 (2013), which explained that even evidence created after the lower-court proceedings are over can’t be added to the record via Rule 8-414. Basically, if it wasn’t in front of the lower court, it’s not an 8-414 error or omission in the record, because it’s not supposed to be in the record.
Rough Justice Is Not Simple Justice: Fourth Circuit Guts Wal-Mart v. Dukes and Creates Circuit Split by Ordering Title VII Claims Certified as Rule 23(b)(3) Class
Judges want to do justice in all cases. In civil-rights cases, they overwhelmingly want to promote equal opportunity and fight racial injustice in America. Title VII employment discrimination cases often provide them with that opportunity. Workers who present persuasive evidence that they were harassed or denied promotions because of their race often find sympathetic jurors and judges who are eager to faithfully enforce fair-employment laws.
One of the more ubiquitous idiomatic phrases used in recent years has been, “It is what it is.” In three consolidated cases decided last month by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the Court turned that phrase around and focused on the question, “Is it what it is?” – or, more precisely, “Is it what it says it is?” On April 23, 2015, Judge Battaglia issued the Majority’s opinion in Sublet v. State, Sept. Term 2014, No. 42; Harris v. State, Sept. Term 2014, No. 59; and Monge-Martinez v. State, Sept. Term 2014, No. 60. The cases concerned the authentication of information derived from social media, required the Court to expand on its four-year-old decision in Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343 (2011), and inquired whether three trial judges had suitably answered whether the proffered social media “was what it says it was.” As part of that inquiry, the Court of Appeals adopted a standard to be used by trial judges in resolving the authentication issue. But, as will be discussed, the standard chosen by the Court presents yet another question: what standard of appellate review should be employed in assessing a trial court’s decision on authenticity?
At long last, the Supreme Court today issued its ruling affirming the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Comptroller v. Wynne, 431 Md. 147 (2013). The Supreme Court’s opinion is here. Justice Alito wrote for the 5-to-4 majority, holding that Maryland’s income tax scheme violates the dormant commerce clause. In the kind of unusual lineup we expect in dormant commerce clause cases, Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Kagan dissented.
The decision could cost Maryland and its localities $200 million in tax refunds. Although the taxpayers were disputing their Howard County income tax, the hardest-hit locality is Montgomery County, which has many residents who earn income in Washington, D.C. or Virginia.
On May 11, the Fourth Circuit published its opinion in United States v. Bajoghli, which held that a Virginia district judge abused his discretion in excluding evidence of acts that were either deleted from an indictment for healthcare fraud or that took place after the scheme was alleged to have ended. In the process, Bajoghli took an extreme view of the doctrine of evidence that is “intrinsic” to an indictment. If the defendant petitions for en banc review, the full Fourth Circuit should take the opportunity to cabin or abandon the “intrinsic evidence” doctrine. Read More…
Blog editor Michael Wein has been all over the new and proposed Maryland Rules regarding unpublished opinions. As noted by Daily Record blogger N. Tucker Meneely, unpublished Court of Special Appeals are already being officially posted online, but the prospects that Maryland courts will actually let you rely on them as trustworthy statements of law is pretty low. Earlier in the month, Tucker also expressed his appreciation for Judge Harrell’s use of “humorous quips and pop culture references” in his opinions. Other links of note from March and April appear after the jump. Read More…
A century ago, pleading causes of action presented many traps for the unwary; entire cases could collapse over minor imperfections or pleading errors. Such rigid formalism ended in 1938 with enactment of the modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Rules 8 and 15 provide much more liberal standards for pleading and amending causes of action, even allowing some plaintiffs to amend their complaints after their trials have ended. But, as the Fourth Circuit recently reminded practitioners in Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Crystal Ridge Development, Inc., No. 13-2234, — F.3d —-, (4th Cir. April 20, 2015), Rule 15’s capacity to accommodate pleading errors has its limits.