April 2025 Maryland Certiorari Grants Include Climate Change Litigation

Yesterday, the Supreme Court of Maryland granted two civil petitions, including in climate change litigation. Both matters have been scheduled for argument in October.

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. B.P. P.L.C., et al.; Anne Arundel County v. B.P. P.L.C., et al.; City of Annapolis v. B.P. P.L.C., et al. – Case No. 11, September Term, 2025 (Bypass Review)
Issues – Torts – From the petition for writ of certiorari: 1) Do the U.S. Constitution and federal law preempt and preclude state law claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of out-of-state and international greenhouse gas emissions on the global climate? 2) Does Maryland law preclude nuisance claims based on injuries allegedly caused by the worldwide production, promotion, and sale of a lawful consumer product? 3) Does Maryland law preclude failure-to-warn claims premised on a duty to warn every person in the world whose use of a product may have contributed to a global phenomenon with effects that allegedly harmed the plaintiff? 4) Does Maryland law preclude trespass claims based on harms allegedly caused by global climate changes arising from the use of a product by billions of third parties around the world outside of producer’s control? From the cross-petition for writ of certiorari: 1) Do appellants/cross-appellees’ complaints state claims for public and private nuisance? 2) Do appellants/cross-appellees’ complaints state claims for strict liability and negligent failure to warn? 3) Do appellants/cross-appellees’ complaints state claims for trespass.

Comptroller of Maryland v. The Potomac Edison Company – Case No. 12, September Term, 2025 (Reported ACM Opinion by Judge Deborah Eyler)
Issues – Tax General – 1) Did ACM erroneously interpret § 11-201(b) of the Tax-General Article, which exempts “tangible personal property … used directly and predominantly in a production activity” from sales-and-use tax, to apply to the equipment that Respondent uses not to produce electricity but to transmit and deliver it from out-of-state generators to its Maryland consumers? 2) In applying ACM’s erroneous interpretation of § 11-201(b) of the Tax-General Article, did the Tax Court err in concluding that much of Respondent’s transmission and delivery equipment was used “directly and predominantly” – that is more than 50 percent – in a production activity, when Respondent’s expert testified that the equipment is used both to deliver and process electricity simultaneously and concurrently and that neither delivery nor processing predominates? 3) Did ACM err in concluding that § 13-508(a) of the Tax-General Article, which governs the time within which a taxpayer may seek a refund of tax paid pursuant to an assessment by the Comptroller, supersedes the generally-applicable four-year limitations period in § 13-1104(g) and allows Respondent the refund of previously-paid sales-and-use-tax that was not paid pursuant to an assessment by the Comptroller? 4) Did ACM err by compelling the State to pay interest on Respondent’s refund claim when the evidence showed that Respondent paid the tax because of an “accounting system irregularity”, a mistake not attributable to the State?