Tag Archive | Rule 5-702

2023 and the Summer of Daubert

By: Derek Stikeleather

The summer of 2023 brought us more than sunshine and cookouts. Each month this summer, the Supreme Court of Maryland handed down a major decision on Rule 5-702 and the Daubert/Rochkind standard for admissibility of expert testimony. June gave us Abruquah v. State, No. 10 (June 20, 2023). July gave us Oglesby v. Baltimore School Associates, No. 26 (July 26, 2023), and August 31, the last day of the 2022 term, brought us Katz, Abosch, Windesheim, Gershman& Freedman, P.A. v. Parkway Neuroscience and Spine Institute, LLC, No. 30 (Aug. 31, 2023). These opinions join the prior term’s lone high-court decision on the same issue, State v. Matthews, 479 Md. 278 (2022), giving us a total of four post-Rochkind Supreme Court precedents reviewing trial-court applications of the Daubert/Rochkind standard. See Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1 (2020). The 296 combined pages of opinions, concurrences, and dissents from this summer’s trilogy will be cited for decades to come in cases applying Rule 5-702. Each case addressed whether the expert’s challenged opinion had a sufficient factual basis under subsection (3) of Rule 5-702, which includes the inquiry into whether there exists an impermissible analytical gap between the expert’s methodology and conclusion.

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The End of Frye-Reed

By Derek Stikeleather

Maryland’s Frye-Reed era appears to be ending. Last month, in Savage v. State,[1] the Court of Appeals handed down a significant decision on “the proper scope for the threshold evaluation of expert scientific evidence” under Maryland’s “Frye–Reed” test. Although the Frye-Reed test, as originally envisioned, would preclude only opinions based on novel scientific methodologies that were not “generally accepted as reliable within the expert’s particular scientific field,”[2] its scope has greatly expanded in recent decades. The Savage opinion highlights that Frye-Reed now precludes opinions, even those based on methodologies that are both (1) not novel and (2) generally accepted, if the reasoning behind the opinion is simply unreliable. Under Savage, the Frye-Reed inquiry requires trial judges—regardless of whether the expert’s underlying methodology is well-established and valid—to examine “whether the expert bridged the ‘analytical gap’ between accepted science and his ultimate conclusion in a particular case.”

How did we get here and where are we headed? Read More…