Panel Splits on Stops for “Security Checks”
By: Chris Mincher
Police officers on the lookout for crime know that people with illegal things usually try to conceal them. If the object is big and bulky enough, sometimes that isn’t so easy. People who carry illicit items under their clothes might have to take some extra measures to make sure they stay there.
On the other hand, while concealing a firearm is typically a crime, generally shoving things into one’s pants is not. As such, Maryland courts have decided that mere adjustments and manipulations of the waistline don’t create a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity without some other indication that a gun is involved. But what if the police officer describes those adjustments and manipulations as specific “security checks” consistent with a potential concealed firearm? Does that pass muster for Fourth Amendment purposes?
Read More…Five for Five: Five Justices Conclude the five-year Limit to Modify a Sentence is Jurisdictional in a 3-1-2-1 Decision
By: Isabelle Raquin
On August 29, 2024, a three-justice plurality and a two-justice concurrence of the Supreme Court of Maryland (SCM) agreed in State v. Thomas, No. 15 (Sept. Term 2023), that the five-year deadline under Maryland Rule 4-345(e)(1) for a circuit court to hear a motion to modify a sentence was a self-imposed jurisdictional deadline per the court’s rule-making authority. Previously, the SCM had held, in the context of the 30-day time to file a notice of appeal, that a deadline established by the SCM’s rule-making authority is a mandatory claims processing rule; which, of course, the parties may waive or forfeit without divesting the court of the power to act. In reliance on the logical application of the mandatory claims processing rule to the court-imposed five-year time for a circuit court to hold a hearing under Rule 4-345(e)(1), Mr. Thomas appealed the circuit court’s failure to timely schedule a hearing as requested, and its subsequent denial of the motion to modify once the deadline passed.
Read More…ACM Holding: Omitting “Against You” Won’t Be Held Against You
By: Chris Mincher
When it comes to the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), words matter. Although the law is clear that there is no specific mandatory Miranda language, straying from the traditional mantra raises questions. For example, is the notice that “everything that you say can be used on the court day” the same as “anything you say can be used against you in a court of law”? While the former ultimately passed muster in Alvarez-Garcia v. State, the Appellate Court panel split on the significance of omitting the phrase “against you.”
Read More…Coyle v. State: Ineffective Certiorari Counsel is Inconsequential
By: Chris Mincher
The murder of William Porter has been a bit of a wellspring for appellate criminal-law questions (many of which have been covered here already) and they’re still popping up 14 years later. Porter v. State produced judicial ink on self-defense, battered-spouse syndrome, the standard for jury instructions, and other wide-ranging topics. Now, earlier this year, Coyle v. State split the Appellate Court as to whether a defendant can, on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, file an untimely petition for writ of certiorari after his attorney — who was appointed by the Office of the Public Defender — botched the initial deadline. (Practice note: If you leave Bethesda at 3 p.m. in standstill beltway rush-hour traffic you may face difficulty getting to the Clerk’s Office in Annapolis by 4:30 close. Just a heads-up.)
Read More…Maryland Courts Ponder Preemption with Puzzling Results
By: Chris Mincher
Bonnie Campbell and her husband, Michael Campbell, got a divorce. As part of that, they executed an agreement in which Mr. Campbell expressly waived any right that he had to the proceeds of a “Federal Thrift Savings” retirement plan that was held by Ms. Campbell. The agreement further provided that if, for any reason, Ms. Campbell failed to change the plan’s beneficiary from Mr. Campbell to someone else, Mr. Campbell would either “disclaim … any entitlement to any benefits” from the Plan, “assign all rights” to receive Plan benefits to the Ms. Campbell’s estate, or directly pay the benefits to Ms. Campbell’s estate.
Ms. Campbell ultimately failed to change the beneficiary from Mr. Campbell to someone else. When she died, Mr. Campbell — rather than disclaiming entitlement to the proceeds, or assigning the rights to or directly paying the proceeds to the estate — applied for and received, without disclosing his previous agreement to the contrary, approximately $717,000 in proceeds from the plan.
Does that sound right? Might it be the correct result anyway?
Read More…Rules or Rulings: When Can an Agency Decide?
Regulatory agencies are often presented with the big issues of the day in different ways. A matter of policy — and controversy — may arise when an agency is requested to make a new regulation or rule, asked to award grants or funding, tasked with overseeing government projects, or resolving administrative complaints. Modern advocates see numerous potential paths to the desired outcome and employ multi-pronged strategies to try to get there.
Obviously, to those advocates, and the stakeholders and public affected, the policy that eventually results matters a lot. To the agencies — and the administrative lawyers who deal with them — how they consider the policy, and what procedures are used, also matter a lot. What power an agency has to pick the posture, forum, and mechanisms in which to consider disputed issues recently generated a split Appellate Court decision in In the Matter of Maryland Office of People’s Counsel, et al., that establishes some limitations on that discretion.
Read More…Whren, Whren, Go Away…: Could the Days of the “Pretextual Traffic Stop” Be Numbered?
By Tia L. Holmes[*]
The “pretextual traffic stop”[1] issue appears to be on the minds of more and more lawyers and judges these days. The issue stems from a policing practice that was approved by the United States Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).[2] For decades, critics have expressed concern that Whren distorted or largely ignored the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that preceded it, gutted Fourth Amendment protections for drivers and passengers, and authorized racial profiling[3] on America’s roadways.[4] These days, it is common to find briefs, scholarly works, and dissenting opinions decrying the policing practice. Even during an oral argument, it is difficult to avoid a discussion about pretextual traffic stops when the circumstances of a traffic stop are at issue.
Last year, I authored a post discussing Judge Dan Friedman’s concurrence in Snyder v. State, 2023 WL 1497289 (Feb. 3, 2023), in which he expressed his view that “Whren was wrong when it was decided in 1996 and remains both wrong and dangerous today.” My dedication to this issue has revealed that Judge Friedman is not alone. He joins dissenting judges throughout the country who also are concerned about Whren’s ongoing effects.[5] But judges have not only dissented. At least two states have declared pretextual traffic stops unconstitutional and departed from Whren on state constitutional grounds.[6] So, what does this mean for Maryland?
Read More…When a Woman’s Questions About Her Right to Choose Is Proof of Intent to Kill at Birth
In Akers v. State (September Term 2022, No. 0925) (unreported), Moira Akers searched the Internet for information about aborting her pregnancy. Akers’ pregnancy was in the first trimester, and she was within her rights to investigate her options to end it. She chose to continue the pregnancy. Still, her cell phone kept a digital record of her search history. Following the death of her newborn—which she maintained was stillborn during a home birth—the police seized her phone and reviewed her search history. At her trial for the first-degree murder of her infant, the prosecutor offered Akers’ search history as proof of her intent to kill the newborn infant. Akers objected, arguing that her questions about her right to lawfully terminate the pregnancy did not generate an inference of an intent to kill a newborn child at birth. In a case of first impression, the Appellate Court of Maryland (ACM) held that Akers’ Internet searches for abortion information made it more likely that she intended to kill her newborn child. The ACM cautioned that its holding “should be read narrowly, and in strict accordance with the specific facts of this case.” Still, the ACM’s decision implicates important questions about a woman’s reproductive rights in the context of a criminal case after Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization.
Read More…Questions Remain About Self-Defense Jury Questions
There are very few dissents in the Appellate Court of Maryland: By my slapdash and amateurish count — which will have some built-in double-counting and so isn’t precisely accurate — out of 899 opinions of the court in 2023, there were only 7 dissents, meaning the panels disagree roughly 0.8 percent of the time. When one issue resurfaces in dissents twice within the same year, it’s worth taking note.
Byrd v. State, No. 1787, Sept. Term 2021 (App. Ct. Md. Jan. 23, 2023), last January contained some conflicting ink in regards to the “some evidence” standard to get a jury instruction relating to “imperfect self-defense,” an issue that was also in play recently in Hollins v. State, No. 2023, Sept. Term 2022 (App. Ct. Md. Dec. 14, 2023), albeit in regards to the alleged violent propensity of a witness. The case stems from a parking-lot fight between McDonald’s coworkers Isiah Hollins and Alexander Alvarenga that resulted in Mr. Hollins stabbing Mr. Alvarenga in the head six or seven times.
Read More…Denial of a Detail and Implied Fabrication under § CJP 10-923: A Matter of First Impression
In Green v. State (No. 0854, September Term 2022), the Appellate Court of Maryland (ACM) decided, as a matter of first impression, whether the defendant’s denial of just one of the elements of the offense amounts to an implied allegation of fabrication necessary for the admission of a prior sexually assaultive act under Cts. & Jud. Procs. (CJP) § 10-923. The ACM also applied the Maryland Supreme Court’s recent decision in Woodlin v. State, 484 Md. 253 (2023), to decide whether the probative value of Green’s prior sexually assaultive behavior was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
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Maryland Appellate Blog 